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Cohen: The Relationship Between Criminal Liability and Sports: A Jurispr

COMMENT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND SPORTS: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL INVESTIGATION*
Sports violence in major American sports increased dramatically throughout the twentieth century,1 with excessively violent
conduct occurring in basketball, football, hockey, and baseball.
Perhaps the most disturbing incident in basketball took place in
1977, when Kermit Washington of the Los Angeles Lakers
punched Rudy Tomjanovich of the Houston Rockets in a fight during a game. 2 Tomjanovich, who had been acting as a peacemaker in
another scuffle, s suffered a concussion, nose, jaw, and skull fractures, facial lacerations, loss of blood, and leakage of spinal fluid
from the brain cavity.'
Football evidences the most abundant and serious examples of
sports violence. Every player in the National Football League suffers at least one injury,5 causing some to 'estimate that a professional player trades twenty years of his life for playing in the
* This Essay was most inspired by R. HoRuow, SPORTS VIOLENcE-THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN PRIVATE LAWMAKING AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1980)

and Fuller, The Case of the

Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). Other contributing sources include W.
LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986); J. OATES, ON BOXING (1987); S. STAFFORD,
CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE

(1977).

1. See R.

HoRRow, SPORTS VIOLENCE-THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAWMAKING AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 9 (1980). In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt was so dis-

traught after watching a football game in which the University of Pennsylvania team attempted to reduce a "Swarthmore star lineman to a bloody pulp," that he threatened to
outlaw football by Executive Order., Markus, Sports Safety: On the Offensive, 1972 TRIAL
12.
2. See Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1979);
see also 23 ATLA L. REP. 107 (1980) (reporting Tomjanovich-Washington case).
3. Tomjanovich, No. H-78-243.
4. Id.
5. J. UNDERWOOD, THE DEATH OF AN AmCAN GAME: THE CRISIS m FOOTBALL 27
(1979).
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NFL." In 1973, Charles "Booby" Clark of the Cincinnati Bengals
hit Dale Hackbart of the Denver Broncos in the back. 7 Hackbart
was left with broken vertebrae, muscular atrophy, and loss of
strength and reflexes in his arm.8 In 1978, Darryl Stingley of the
New England Patriots was thrown an un-catchable pass. Nonetheless, Jack Tatum of the then Oakland Raiders hit Stingley head
on, causing Stingley permanent paralysis.' In 1979, Steve Luke of
the Green Bay Packers thrust his forearm into the face of Norm
Bulaich of the Miami Dolphins. Bulaich sustained a split jawbone
and a splintered bone around his eye. A final example transpired
in 1986, when noseguard Charles Martin of the Green Bay Packers
slammed quarterback Jim McMahon of the Chicago Bears to the
ground. 10 It was later discovered that Martin placed a "hit list" of
players' numbers, including McMahon's, on his towel. 1
While football occasions an abundance of injuries, hockey lives
up to its reputation as the most vicious professional sport. 2 The
most infamous hockey incident took place in 1969.13 Ted Green of
the Boston Bruins struck Wayne Maki of the St. Louis Blues with
a gloved hand;" Maki retaliated by smashing Green with a hockey
stick, fracturing Green's skull and causing massive hemorrhaging.' 8
After two brain operations, Green only partially recovered.' 6 A
more recent example occurred in 1984 in a game between the Quebec Nordiques and Montreal Canadiens. Referees ejected ten players and assessed 257 minutes in penalties for two bench clearing
brawls.' 7 Of the fourteen separate fights, one stands out as particularly shocking. Louis Sleigher hit Jean Hamel in the head, leaving
6. Hofeld, Athletes-Their Rights and Correlative Duties, 19 TRiAL LAW GUIDE 383,
401 (1975).
7. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 444
U.S. 931 (1979).
8. Id.
9. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 16.02, at 16-4 n.13 (G. Uberstine ed.

1990).
10. Lennard, For the Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 5, 1987, at 96.
11. Id.
12. Note, Controlling Sports Violence: Too Late for the Carrots-Bringon the Big
Stick, 74 IowA L. REv. 681 (1989).
13. Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. Civ. 1970); Regina v. Maki, 3 O.R.
780 (1970).
14. Regina v. Maki, 3 O.R. 780, 780 (1970).
15. Id. at 781.
16. Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. Civ. 1970); Regina v. Maki, 3 O.R.
780 (1970).
17. LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEuR SPORTS § 16.02, at 16-5 n.14 (G. Uberstine ed.

1990).
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Hamel motionless on the ice for several minutes. 8 Hamel was later
removed from the ice, spitting up blood and with his right arm
hanging limp.1 9
Baseball, usually considered the sport least conducive to violence, uses two of the most dangerous weapons in professional
sports-a bat and a ball.2 0 A pitch may be thrown at speeds in
excess of 100 miles per hour, allowing only four-tenths of a second
for the batter to respond.21 The increasing ability of batters to hit
home runs causes pitchers to respond with revenge pitches.2" During a game in 1987, Eric Show, a pitcher for the San Diego Padres,
hit Andre Dawson, the Chicago Cubs all-star outfielder, in the left
cheek with a pitch.2" The incident occurred just two innings after
Dawson hit a home run off Show. Dawson's cheek required twentyfour stitches.24
One consequential aspect of the increasing violence in sports is
its relationship to criminal law. Legal scholars, judges, and law
practitioners generally agree that if a player's conduct is within the
bounds of what one would reasonably foresee as a hazard of the
game, the violent act is authorized.2 5 If the act is authorized, it
does not expose the perpetrator to criminal liability, even if serious
injury or death to another athlete results. 2 6 Some even argue that

criminal sanctions should not apply to violent acts that occur in
the sports arena because sports violence does not threaten the
public in the same way as off-the-field violence.2
This is not to suggest that athletes, simply because they don
athletic uniforms, enjoy formal exemption from the criminal justice system. 28 Theoretically, shoulder pads and a helmet should not
shield athletes from liability for their actions on the field. Practically, however, this may be the case because prosecutors rarely file
criminal charges. 29 Furthermore, courts have difficulty in defining
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. R. HoRRow, supra note 1, at 10.
21. Hersch, It's War Out There, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 20, 1987, at 14-16.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. Tz.ENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 281 (1986) [hereinafter G.
SCHUBERT].
26. Id. at 281-282.
27. See 2 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 420

(1986).
28. G. SCHUBERT, supra note 25, at 282.
29.

See R. HoRRow, SPORTS VIOLENCE--THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRvATE LAWMAKCRIMINAL LAW 69-74 (1980); Beumler, Liability in Professional Sports: An Al-
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the elements of a crime as related to sports violence,30 and juries
tend to be sympathetic toward athletes.31
In an attempt to standardize what constitutes criminal behavior in sports, and to "deter and punish, through criminal penalties,
the episodes of excessive violence that are increasingly characterizing professional sports,"3 Representative Ronald M. Mottl introduced to Congress the Sports Violence Act of 1980.33 The bill
provided:
Section 115. Excessive violence during professional sports
events:
(a) Whoever, as a player in a professional sports event, knowingly uses excessive physical force and thereby causes a risk of
significant bodily injury ... shall be fined not more than $5000
or imprisoned not more than one year ...

Excessive physical force means physical force that(A) has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of
the sport;
(B) is unreasonably violent; and
(C) could not be reasonably foreseen, or was not consented to,
by the injured person, as a normal hazard of such person's involvement in such sports event."'

The proposed Act, which ultimately failed,"' attempted to differentiate the normal physical contact of sports from the contact a civilized society deems criminal under any circumstances. Whether
that is possible is questionable.
A decision not to prosecute professional athletes is objectionable on the grounds that society maintains a duty to prosecute any
ternative to Violence?, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 919 (1980).
30. LAW oF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPoRTs

§ 16.04[1](b], at 16-13 (G. Uberstine
ed. 1990). The judge in the Green case commented: "I do not think that any of the actions
that would normally be considered assaults in ordinary walks of life can possibly be, within
the context that I am considering, considered assaults at all." 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (1970).
31. See Beumler, supra note 29, at 926.
32. H.R. 7903, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. REc. 20,890 (1980).
33. Id. A second legislative attempt was made to control violence in sports. In 1983,
Representative Thomas A. Daschle of South Dakota introduced the Sports Violence Arbitration Act. H.R. 4495, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H10,579 (daily ed. Dec. 14,
1983). The bill differed from the Sports Violence Act of 1980 in that it would have imposed
civil rather than criminal penalties. Id. An arbitration board was proposed to settle grievances between players resulting from the use of excessive violence. Id.
34. H.R. 7903, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126 CONG. REc. 20,890 (1980).
35. Some claim that all federal legislative attempts failed because sports violence lacks
widespread concern. Consequently, legislators expressed reservation over utilizing federal
resources to control a problem that could best be handled at the local level. See Sprotzer,
Violence in Professional Sports: A Need for Federal Regulation, 86 CAsE & COMMENT 3
(May/June 1981).
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conduct constituting criminal behavior, irrespective of whether the
potential defendant wears an athletic uniform. Arguably, however,
as a unique and beneficial societal institution, sports and its participants deserve special treatment and, in some situations, immunity from the criminal law.
Albeit unconventional, this Comment analyzes these issues
through a jurisprudential lens not typically found in sports-related
topics. The Comment is written as three fictional, modern-day judicial opinions from the Court of Final Appeals of the Republic of
Amercarth-a hypothetical jurisdiction. In most circumstances
traditional law review style footnotes have been omitted. Notwithstanding the narrative means employed, accuracy and detail of
substantive considerations, policy arguments, and other particulars
have been strictly preserved. The fictional opinions address boxing,
perhaps today's most controversial sport. Unlike baseball, basketball, football and hockey, fighting is boxing's sole purpose: the
fight is the sport. Analyzing the relationship between criminal liability and sports in the context of boxing forces the contemplation
of marginal issues. The reader should note at the outset that, as
with most judicial opinions, Justices Jillian, Todan, and Hindan
leave many questions unanswered and sometimes expound readily
assailable arguments. Therein, however, lies the methodology of
this essay. By evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the fictional opinions, the reader comes to understand the difficulty underlying the issue of whether to impose criminal liability on professional athletes for behavior that could be construed as nothing
more than "part of the game."
REPUBLIC v. JORDAR
THE COURT OF FINAL APPEALS
The defendant, having been indicted for the crime of criminal
homicide, was found guilty by a jury of his peers sitting in the
Court of Initial Trials. The defendant brings a petition of error
before this Court claiming, inter alia, that the trial judge's charge
to the jury on the issue of intent constitutes reversible error. This
Court of Final Appeals accepts petitioner's claim and REVERSES
the lower court's decision.
Published by Institutional Repository, 1990
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OPINION OF THE COURT
JILLIAN, J.F., CHIEF JUSTICE.
This is a criminal action brought by the Republic States of
Amercarth (the Republic) against Myles Jordar (Jordar), a professional boxer, for the unlawful death of his opponent during a boxing match. A jury found Jordar guilty of criminal homicide in violation of Section 3.91 of the Republic of Amercarth General
Statutes. The defendant appeals. On behalf of a plurality of the
Court, I offer the following opinion.
The facts are not disputed. Jordar, the defendant below and
appellant here, began his professional boxing career eleven years
prior to the fateful match in question. Fighting as a heavyweight,
his record was twenty-seven wins (eighteen by knockout), two
losses, and one draw.
Martin Singer (Singer), the deceased, boxed for nine years, accruing a record of nineteen wins and one loss. He held the Global
Boxing Association (G.B.A.) heavyweight championship belt at the
time he met Jordar in the ring. In accordance with G.B.A. policy,
both boxers underwent physical examinations prior to the match.
The G.B.A. found the boxers to be in excellent condition and issued permits to the boxers to engage in the title fight. The bout
commenced at 8:00 p.m. and was scheduled for twelve, three-minute rounds. Safety regulations required referees and a physician to
monitor the match. An ambulance equipped with life support apparatus remained on location.
The gong of the opening bell sparked the boxers into action.
Each boxer pounced upon the other with lightening-fast jabs and
rock-hard crosses. Rounds one and two were evenly fought. Singer,
however, dominated the third where, with a string of flurries to
Jordar's body followed by a devastating right hook to the ear,
Singer knocked Jordar to the canvas. Jordar rose by the count of
four and was given the mandatory "standing eight" count. After
Jordar indicated that he had recovered from the knockdown, the
referee signaled for the boxers to continue. Singer attacked with an
assault of blows to the mid-section which propelled Jordar to the
ropes, causing him to hunch over in a defensive position. The fight
doctor entered the ring between rounds three and four to examine
Jordar. The doctor observed the dilation of Jordar's pupils and
questioned him on his name, address, and other simple questions.
Concluding that Jordar was capable of continuing, the physician
notified the referee and the judges.
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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The physician's decision to allow the fight to continue provided Jordar with renewed hope of success. Jordar had been losing
the match up to this point, and he responded positively by winning
four of the next eight rounds. With the opening bell of the eleventh round, Jordar confidently danced quickly across the ring
flicking jabs into Singer's face. Fearing that he might lose his title,
Singer flung himself at Jordar, and the two battled head-to-head in
the corner of the ring. Jordar retaliated with a left-right combination to Singer's ribs. The attack forced Singer to lower his hands,
leaving his head vulnerable. Capitalizing on his opponent's mistake, Jordar connected with two devastating hooks that caused
Singer to collapse through the ropes and slam his head on the concrete floor outside of the ring.
The ring doctor realized that Singer was hurt and rushed to
his side. Singer stated that he had no feeling in the left side of his
body. The doctor hypothesized that Singer had suffered neurological damage. A medical stretcher was summoned, and an ambulance
transported Singer to a nearby hospital. Despite vigorous medical
and surgical treatment, Singer died two days later of a subdural
hematoma-in lay terms, a brain clot.

The Republic charged Jordar with violating Section 3.91 of the
Republic of Amercarth General Statutes. Section 3.91 provides
that "[a]ny person who wilfully causes the death of another shall
be guilty of murder and punished by life imprisonment." In construing this section, our courts consistently apply a stringent threepronged test to determine culpability: (i) the defendant must have
committed an actus reus; (ii) the defendant's act must legally
cause the death of a human being; and (iii) the defendant must
have an accompanying state of mind, often referred to as mens rea.
The petitioner alleges no error as to issues one and two, and we
agree that the record fully supports the jury's findings that Jordar
fashioned an affirmative act or conduct sufficient to satisfy the actus reus requirement. Jordar struck several blows to Singer's head,
one of which knocked him to the floor; his punches were the legal
and proximate cause of Singer's death. The only issue before this
Court concerns intent.
For Jordar to be found criminally liable, the jury must have
found that he possessed the necessary mens rea of criminal homicide. The seminal case, Republic v. Gerald, 222 R.C.A. 1022, establishes that the "mens rea requirement will be satisfied if the dePublished by Institutional Repository, 1990
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fendant intended to kill the victim, or if the defendant had
knowledge that the act was substantially likely to result in the victim's death, or if the defendant intended to do serious bodily harm
short of death but actually succeeded in a killing." Upon recommendation of the trial judge, counsel for the Republic and counsel
for Jordar submitted potential jury instructions. The judge
charged the jury with the following instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, in order to find Jordar, the defendant,
guilty of criminal homicide you must decide that he intended to
kill Singer, or that he had intended serious bodily harm, or that
he had knowledge that a killing was substantially likely to occur.
In reaching a decision, it is necessary for you to distinguish the
intent of engaging in a boxing match from the intent of criminal
homicide. In fact, for our purposes here, forget entirely that
these men were boxing. Put that out of your minds. Just ask
yourselves whether Jordar had the requisite criminal intent to
find him guilty.
This instruction was erroneous and constitutes reversible error. This Court recently abandoned the distinction between "general" and "specific" intent, and employs instead the comprehensive
term "criminal intent." To embrace the notion that the intent necessary for boxing differs from the criminal intent necessary for
criminal homicide creates an unfounded and dangerous distinction
which this Court refuses to adopt.
The intent required for boxing is necessarily indistinguishable
from the intent required to assert criminal liability. Unlike any
other sport, boxing participants excel by injuring their opponents.
Winning occurs in one of three ways. First, the boxer who lands
the most punches in a match wins by "points." Second, the boxer
who beats his opponent until the opponent has no possibility of
prevailing (even though the opponent may still be standing) wins
by "technical knockout," commonly referred to as a "T.K.O." Last,
the boxer who fells his opponent, causing the opponent to remain
on the mat for at least ten seconds, wins by "knockout." In either
of the three settings-points, T.K.O, or knockout-the boxer
prevails by battering his opponent. To differentiate between the
intent required to box and the intent required to commit criminal
homicide is to invent a non-existent distinction. Accordingly, this
Court finds error with the instruction given by the learned trial
judge.
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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It is my opinion that in the future, the prosecutor need not
seek an indictment for a professional athlete's actions during a
competition. The courts of the Republic should not be forced to
entertain these types of cases. Pursuant to the Prosecutorial Standards of the Republic, "the prosecutor may in some circumstances,
and for good cause consistent with the public interest, decline to
prosecute a case, notwithstanding that evidence may exist which
would support a conviction." That boxing is a good cause consistent with the public interest is well known. As with other sports,
boxing deserves credit for bettering the lives of many impoverished
and destitute youths by providing a respectable outlet to vent their
anger and bitterness toward society. Boxing youths are often first
attracted to the boxing ring to perfect their already existing skills
of wounding others. As they enter the brotherhood of the gym,
these street-hardened children undergo a dramatic transformation.
The new peer group-other boxers-evaluates new members by
their boxing capabilities. The newcomer soon learns that self-discipline is the key to achieving success and status in the gym. Rigorous training, strict dieting, and total overall discipline combine to
re-focus anger and bitterness towards concentration on pugilism.
Moreover, boxing provides Amercarth citizens with enjoyable entertainment. As with other sports, professional and amateur boxing
give spectators a reason to unite: "cheer" for the popular boxer;
"boo" the hated boxer. One author comments on the magical space
of the boxing ring:
There as in no other public arena does the individual as a
unique physical being assert himself; there, for a dramatic if
fleeting period of time, the great world with its moral and political complexities, its terrifying impersonality, ceases to exist.
Men fighting one another with only their fists and their cunning
are all contemporaries, all brothers, belonging to no historical
time. The crowd, borne along with them, belongs to no historical
time.. .. . In the brightly lit ring, man is in extremis, performing
an atavistic rite or agon for the mysterious solace of those who
can participate vicariously in such drama: the drama of life in
the flesh. Boxing has become [the] tragic theater. 6
A second reason why the prosecutor need not seek an indictment of a professional athlete is that limited resources necessarily
restrict the prosecutor's labors to the prosecution of society's most
36.

J. OATES, ON BOXING 80 (1986).

Published by Institutional Repository, 1990
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offensive criminals, a class of which the professional athlete as
player is not a part. This is not to suggest that full and impartial
enforcement of the law is not theoretically encouraged. Rather,
pragmatic concerns mandate the prosecution of heinous criminals
such as rapists, murderers, and drug dealers before the prosecution
of professional athletes for conduct engaged in during the course of
an event.
Assume that a "typical" urban prosecutor oversees an average
of one hundred and fifty prosecutions per year. Assume further
that in any given year the prosecutor has over five hundred cases
from which to select potential criminal defendants. Among those
five hundred cases presented, four hundred and fifty involve heinous criminals; the remaining fifty involve persons acting in socially acceptable contexts (e.g., professional athletes.) Thus, as
members of society fearing for our well-being and relying on the
criminal law for protection, we demand that prosecutors focus
their time and energy on society's most repugnant criminals.
The Republic should refuse to prosecute cases such as the one
at bar because criminal sanctions serve as an inappropriate means
by which to control violent behavior in sports. Retribution and deterrence are the two primary justifications for the imposition of penal sanctions; neither, however, is effective in or applicable to the
context of sports.
The broad premise upon which the theory of retribution rests
is that an irresponsible decision, one which contravenes societal
norms, warrants punishment because the offender must "pay for
the crime." Put another way, when one commits a crime, retributive theory contends that it is important for the criminal to receive
a commensurate punishment in order to restore societal "peace of
mind." Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, a 19th century English judge
and historian of the criminal law, noted:
[T]he infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression
and a solemn ratification and justification to the hatred which is
excited by the commission of the offense.. . . The criminal law
thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to hate
the criminals and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments which express it. 7
But where did Jordar err? Where did he contravene societal
norms? This unfortunate event occurred during the heated battle
of a boxing match. As with all boxers, Jordar was trained by
37. 2 A HISTORY

OF THE CimINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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coaches to attack until the opponent drops or the referee intervenes. Jordar was simply "playing the game." There was no antisocial behavior. Retribution here fails to provide a workable justification for imposing criminal liability upon an athlete.
The theory of deterrence also plays little part in controlling
violent behavior during sporting events. The concept of deterrence
is typically divided into "special" deterrence and "general" deterrence. Special deterrence, sometimes called deterrence by intimidation, refers to steps taken to dissuade the particular offender
from repeating a crime by bringing the consequences of further
criminal behavior to the offender's attention, thereby inducing the
offender to refrain from such conduct in the future. By contrast,
general deterrence refers to the impact a sentence and conviction
has on others because, in theory, people will refrain from criminal
behavior when they see that the criminal justice system punishes
those who commit crimes.
For the athlete, both special and general deterrence present a
confusing dilemma. Professional sports provides society with a
cause to unite. Most Amercarth citizens advocate sports participation. Cutting across all socio-economic classifications, a sports team
gives reason for an entire city or town to unite in furtherance of a
mutual cause, namely the team's success. For example, fans at any
given football or basketball game come from all backgrounds: black
and white, rich and poor. This helps explains why, even from a
young age, participation in sports is strongly encouraged to provide
discipline, exercise, and stress relief. As these child athletes become adult athletes and enter the professional level, monetary
compensation and fame induce continued participation in sports.
How is it that society welcomes participation and promotes aggressive and competitive play, yet punishes certain conduct necessary
to and inherent in the game?
Finally, to assert criminal liability over a defendant requires
that the defendant be on notice that the behavior is criminal.
Often reduced to the maxim nulla poena sine lege, the principle of
legality forbids the retroactive definition of crime. That is, a defendant should not be punished for a crime that has not already
been proscribed by the legislature as criminal. No such statutes in
our Republic have been enacted that deal with violence during a
sporting event. Nor have any existing statutes been applied successfully to sports related violence. How, then, was Jordar to be
put on notice that Section 3.91, which reads that "[any person
who wilfully causes the death of another shall be guilty of murder. . . ." applied to a boxing match? Sports is a unique instituPublished by Institutional Repository, 1990
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tion. If the legislature intended sports violence to be criminally actionable, our Congressional Representatives
would have
propounded such legislation.
The decision not to prosecute does not mean that a professional athlete acting violently during a game goes without punishment. Various alternative dispute resolution methods, including
civil mechanisms, game officiating, league fines and suspensions,
control violent behavior in sports more effectively than the imposition of criminal liability. Tort remedies, for example, compensate
the injured sports victim who brings an action, whether for assault,
battery, or negligence, against a tortfeasor and recovers both compensatory and punitive damages.
Second, game officials maintain sufficient control over violent
behavior during sporting events. The officials' authority to impose
penalties imputes significant administrative capability. For example, by assessing a football player a fifteen yard penalty for a personal foul, the game official deters wrongful conduct, especially in
light of peer pressure from other players and coaches."8
League disciplinary action also provides effective behavioral
control devices. Although monetary sanctions are questionable as a
deterrent, excessively violent behavior calls for fines and suspensions by the governing body of the appropriate sport. Most professional athletes take great pride in their competitive ability and,
notwithstanding the financial benefits, enjoy playing their
game-indeed, winning is not the "only thing." A league suspension prevents a player from partaking in the sport, and therefore
constitutes an effective deterrent.
Finally, assembling cases presents many proof problems for
the prosecution. Owners, coaches, referees, and players have a
vested interest in the outcome of a given trial, namely, their jobs.
As a result, few are willing to testify in any way adversely to their
sport. Discovery becomes a formidable process, and these witnesses, because of their biases, serve better for the defense.
In conclusion, on behalf of a plurality of the Bench, I
REVERSE.
38. One quarterback commented about a player in a football game:
A personal foul call ruined everything. We ran twelve plays, covering seventyfive yards and were about to score when my offensive lineman got into a fight.
The fifteen yard penalty assessed by the referee forced us to kick a field goal
instead of trying for a touchdown. Sure enough, we missed the kick. The coaches
chewed him out like I'd never seen and, for the rest of the quarter, that lineman
was the "black sheep" of the huddle. Maybe it was good in a way, because he
never even got a holding call the rest of the season.

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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TODAN, D.T., Concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Chief Justice,
I feel that certain theoretical arguments complement her opinion.
If this Court declares that under our law Jordar has committed a
crime, then our law itself violates all notions of common sense. At
the outset, I admit that my justification for acquitting this defendant may incite opposition until examined genuinely. Nonetheless, I
probe onward and offer the following concurring opinion.
Conventional notions of positivism play no part in this case. A
positivist system grants to the State the sole power to promulgate
positive laws, thereby determining the liberty of that State's citizens. Mere positivism must be rejected, however, when it results in
an unjust deprivation of a person's natural rights. The enacted
laws of the Republic of Amercarth, including all statutes and common law precedents enacted thereunder, did not apply to Jordar
and Singer when they boxed in their match.
Rather, the laws of the state of Nature governed on that evening. From antiquity, theorists recognized that the most fundamental principles of law or government originated from the notion
of contract or agreement. Philosophers of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, including Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes, first
established the concept and based government itself on a social
compact entered into by the free accord of society's members.
Prior to organized society, humankind existed in a chaotic and
frenzied state of Nature, devoid of all laws and order. To escape
the inconvenience and disarray of the state of Nature, humankind
chose to co-exist and form a social contract, thereby establishing
the entity of government.
It is my view that while engaged in the art of pugilism, men
such as Jordar and Singer regress temporarily to the state of Nature. As they battled each other on the fateful night, it was instinct, not reason, that governed their efforts. There was no coexistence; rather, there was only survival. Societal laws and decrees,
including Section 3.91, no longer held any importance.
It is axiomatic that positivism rests upon the possibility of
man's co-existence in society. When circumstances arise in which
co-existence is impossible, a condition that underlies all our precedents and statutes ceases to exist, as does the force of our positive
law. As the boxing match ends-or other sporting events for that
matter-and the boxers hug each other with mutual admiration
and respect, co-existence and the workings of positivism start
anew.
Published by Institutional Repository, 1990
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A natural response to my argument is that I am being unfaithful to the law. Where do we draw the line as to when our laws
apply to a given situation, and when they do not? Can we choose
not to apply the law at free will?
As with all the courts of the Republic, this Court frequently
decides a case by instrumentally reasoning from the result backwards, manipulating legal principles along the way. This is creative
lawyering. Even in this concurring opinion I am guilty of this outcome-oriented analysis. Perhaps I could have reached the same
conclusion with traditional legal logic. To do so, however, would be
to shun all sense of realism. Jordar broke the letter of the law, and
to this end the majority opinion fails to display well-reasoned analysis. It is my opinion, however, that as participants in a very
unique and beneficial institution in our society, athletes deserve
preferential treatment and, in some cases, immunity from the law.
By judicial fiat, consequently, I would acquit Jordar and REVERSE the decision of the lower court.
HINDAN, R.H., Dissenting.
I vehemently disagree with the Chief Justice's uncommitted
analysis. The legislature enacted Section 3.91 to punish "[a]ny person who willfully causes the death of another . . . ." As evidenced
by the jury's findings, Jordar violated this statute. On that fateful
night Jordar and Singer met in the ring, Jordar, with calculated
reason, threw a barrage of punches that killed Singer. That the
incident occurred during a boxing match merely clouds the issue; it
does not negate the reach of the criminal law.
Boxing is a sport. Unlike Roman gladiatorial combat, boxing is
not a fight to the death. Boxing as we know it in Amercarth derives
solely from the bare knuckle fighting of 18th century England.
This type of fight, in which maiming and death were not the goal,
was known as a Prize Fight, and was a voluntary contest between
two men, usually a challenger and a champion. Spectators placed
bets on which man would knock the other down or draw first
blood. Known as the "gentlemen's sport," these matches were seldom monitored by referees, and the crowd actively discouraged
foul play.
Against this backdrop, we understand that after seeing his opponent was hurt, Jordar had time to stop his attack before the final blow. Instead, he persevered without mercy. Jordar was a professional boxer with twenty professional fights and fifty-five
amateur fights. He was an expert on when a boxer was ready to
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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fall. Had Jordar stopped his onslaught only for a moment, thereby
giving the referee a split-second to observe Singer, the match
would have been stopped and Jordar awarded a technical knockout. The death could have been prevented.
Regarding the Chief Justice's plea for prosecutors not to pursue these types of cases, it is my opinion that our system already
contains the mandatory correction devices. The legal doctrines of
consent and involuntary reflex, for example, allow extenuating circumstances to be taken into account without the judiciary sitting
as a super-legislature dictating to the Republic the methodology
for choosing its cases.
That athletes consent to all conduct incident to a game is the
traditional defense used by an athlete defendant facing punishment. The fundamental proposition underlying the defense is that
an athlete cannot be held criminally liable because the victim consented to the conduct by participating in the sport. A defendant's
privilege is limited to the conduct to which the victim consents. In
choosing to partake in a boxing match, Singer consented only to
being punched and, perhaps, knocked out; he did not consent to
being murdered. Even if Singer actually consented to the infliction
of harm, this consent would not be effective because he does not
have the authority to waive the State's interest in controlling
crime. That is, although Singer may be able to consent to conduct
by another, Singer had no authority to waive criminal liability for
Jordar.
Under the involuntary reflex doctrine, a defendant athlete
typically argues that because professional athletes are customarily
trained for a specific sport from childhood, and that violence is
part of most contact sports, violence by the professional athlete is
the product of an instinctive reflexive action. Jordar contends that
coaches of all sports teach young athletes to intimidate an opponent and to precipitate physical altercations rather than to avoid
them. I disagree. Coaches and managers discourage, not encourage,
violence in boxing. As the Chief Justice hints, boxing's proponents
refer to the sport as a "craft" in which skill, not brute strength,
prevails. Prior to a match, the skilled boxer views films of the opponent and plans a strategy. Dancing and "rope-a-dope" may be
the tactic for the smaller boxer fighting the larger. By comparison,
for the larger and more powerful boxer, maintaining control of the
ring and stalking the opponent may prove more effective. I cannot
accept the argument that a professional boxer such as Jordar had
no control over his actions and no chance of stopping his attack.
Finally, the Chief Justice implies that a successful prosecution
Published by Institutional Repository, 1990
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in this case opens the door to an already unmanageable case load
and advises that, in addition to resource restrictions, prosecutors
face complex problems in assembling a case. In defense of their
sport and ultimately their jobs, league officials, coaches, and players are tentative in their cooperation. Accordingly, the Chief Justice contends that amassing the necessary witnesses and evidence
presents insurmountable obstacles. I disagree with that view. As
technology develops and recording expenses decrease, television
cameras document most professional events. As demonstrative evidence, these recordings provide a cost-effective means for the prosecutor to amass and plan a case, notwithstanding the biases and
testimony of key witnesses.
In her tempered opinion, the Chief Justice ignores the issue of
criminal immunity for professional athletes. Society relies on the
criminal law to protect its citizens from antisocial conduct; only
with this security can contemporary civilization function. Weak or
ineffective penal laws jeopardize basic human interests. Nothing is
more important for the maintenance of tranquility of the community or for the preservation of the individual than the government's ability to secure absolute, non-discriminating enforcement
of the law. By creating an exception for athletes, either by judicial
fiat, executive action, or legislative enactment, we necessarily grant
immunity to anyone clothed in an athletic uniform. Hence, whenever the boxer puts on boxing gloves, or a football player football
pads, society allows freedom to disregard all positive laws of the
Republic. I cannot support that view.
Other alternatives for a defendant professional athlete to
evade punishment also exist. For example, this case seems wellsuited for an act of executive clemency. The legal systems of most
civilized countries recognize the need for the right of appeal to an
authority other than legislative or judicial law. Clemency provides
a means of modifying, in particular circumstances, the application
of rigid, uniform laws. Often defined as an act of leniency or a disposition to be merciful, the word clemency includes a pardon, commutation of sentence, reprieve, or remission of fines and forfeiture.
Unlike this Court, the Chief Executive, as head-of-state, retains
the authority to alter Jordar's conviction without impairing or offending the Legislature. Clemency allows consideration of special
or extenuating circumstances that cannot be tolerated during the
normal judicial process. Although Jordar clearly violated the literal
wording of Section 3.91, his moral character is exemplary. An act
of clemency would commute his sentence-here, life imprisonment-and erase any existence of moral guilt or blame that accomhttp://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss2/6
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panies his conviction for criminal homicide. It should be noted
that executive clemency would relate only to Jordar's criminal liability, and does not preclude civil action by discharging the offender's liability to make restitution for damages. Thus the civil
action by Singer's estate against Jordar for damages would not be
barred.
It is for these reasons that I offer this dissenting opinion.
Wayne R. Cohen*

* B.B.A., 1988, University of Michigan; J.D* Candidate, 1991, University of Miami
School of Law.
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